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Abstract
The neurocognitive and social cognitive correlates of two types of formal thought disorder (i.e., bizarre-idiosyncratic and
concrete thinking) were examined in 47 stable outpatients with schizophrenia. Both types of thinking disturbance were related
to impairments in verbal learning, intrusions in verbal memory, immediate auditory memory, sustained attention, and social
schema knowledge. Distractibility during an immediate memory task was associated with more frequent bizarre verbalizations
but not concreteness. Impaired verbal learning rate and intrusions in verbal memory independently contributed to the prediction
of bizarre responses, whereas intrusions in verbal memory and impaired immediate memory independently contributed to
concrete thinking. This pattern of findings is consistent with the view that neurocognitive and, possibly, social cognitive deficits
underlie these two aspects of formal thinking disturbance in schizophrenia.
D 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Formal thought disorder is a multifaceted construct
that encompasses a diverse set of thinking disturban-
ces, including loose and indirect associations, overly
abstract or concrete responses, illogicality, inappro-
priate intrusion of personal material, and unusual
word usage (Holzman et al., 1986). Thought disorder
has been considered to be a core feature of schizo-
phrenia (Bleuler, 1950) and has been described as
either a positive symptom (Andreasen and Olsen,
1982) or as part of the disorganization syndrome
(Liddle, 1987). Longitudinal studies have found that
the severity of thought disorder in schizophrenia is
moderately stable typically (Adler and Harrow, 1974;
Asarnow and MacCrimmon, 1982; Docherty et al.,
2003) but becomes exacerbated during acute episodes
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of illness. However, even in relatively stable out-
patients, the frequency of thinking disturbance has
been found to be greater among patients with
schizophrenia than nonpsychiatric controls (Sponheim
et al., 2003). Formal thought disorder appears to
lessen in geriatric patients with chronic schizophrenia,
but this might be an artifact of decreased verbal
productivity in older patients (Bowie et al., 2005).
This pattern of findings suggests that formal thought
disorder reflects, in part, state-like exacerbations in
illness but also might be associated with more stable
underlying neurocognitive impairments. This conclu-
sion is supported by longitudinal studies that have
found the relationship between thought disorder and
discrete neurocognitive deficits to be stronger during
periods of stabilization than during acute episodes
(Asarnow and MacCrimmon, 1982; Nuechterlein et
al., 1986; Pandurangi et al., 1994). Neuropsycholo-
gists and experimental psychopathologists have fre-
quently assessed the quality of thinking using proverb
interpretation tasks (Lezak, 1995). Accurate interpre-
tation of proverbs requires the individual to report the
consensually recognized meaning from the symbols in
the proverb. Bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking is defined
as a unique response that often deviates from social
norms and that may contain confused, contradictory,
or illogical verbalizations. Consequently, idiosyncratic
responses are typically inappropriate or inadequate in
relation to the presented stimulus and are often
difficult for others to empathize with or understand
(Marengo et al., 1986). Assessment of thought
disturbance on proverb interpretation tasks involves
scoring the quality of participants’ responses with
standardized dimensional measures of bizarre-idio-
syncratic and concrete thinking. Patients with schizo-
phrenia perform more poorly than nonpsychiatric
controls on proverb interpretation tasks, with their
responses containing more idiosyncratic and concrete
thinking disturbances (Carter, 1986; Sponheim et al.,
2003). While patients with schizophrenia have been
found to make both idiosyncratic and concrete
thinking errors, these two types of thinking distur-
bances have been found to be only weakly to
moderately related (Craig, 1973; Silverstein et al.,
1993; Sponheim et al., 2003). A third construct based
on proverb tasks, correct abstraction, is related to
concrete thinking, but involves not only the ability to
abstract beyond the concrete elements of the proverb
but also to correctly identify the consensually derived
meaning of the proverb.
Despite the clinical significance and stability of
thought disorder, relatively little is known about its
neurocognitive underpinnings (Kerns and Berenbaum,
2002). Formal thought disorder has been found to
relate to impairments in attention (Docherty and
Gordinier, 1999; Harvey et al., 1998; Moser et al.,
2001; Nuechterlein et al., 1986; Silverstein et al.,
1991; Sowell et al., 2000), memory (Harvey et al.,
1998; Nestor et al., 1998; Serper et al., 1990), and
executive functions (Barrera et al., 2005; Nestor et al.,
1998). However, few studies have examined multiple
neurocognitive domains as correlates of formal
thought disorder within the same sample. In addition,
few, if any, studies have included measures of social
cognition. Furthermore, the specific contributions of
these measures beyond their correlations with general
intellectual ability have not been adequately studied.
Prior studies of the neurocognitive contributors to
bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking have produced incon-
sistent results. In their study of the determinants of
idiosyncratic thinking, Harrow et al. (1989) noted that
idiosyncratic responses are often not recognized as
such by the speaker and can be reduced when the
speaker is directed to focus on the quality of the
response. These observations led them to hypothesize
that bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking might, at least in
part, result from impaired access to knowledge of what
behavior is socially or contextually appropriate for a
situation and from a reduced ability to monitor their
verbalizations. In one of the first empirical studies
designed to identify neurocognitive correlates of
bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking Silverstein et al. (1993)
used a battery of linguistic, complex attentional, and
intellectual measures and found that 25% of the
variance in idiosyncratic thinking could be explained
by estimated intellectual ability and arithmetic perfor-
mance. Similarly, Carpenter and Chapman (1982)
reported a moderate relationship between bizarre-
idiosyncratic thinking and intellectual ability. Howev-
er, Sponheim et al. (2003) failed to find significant
relationships between idiosyncratic thinking and intel-
lectual ability, memory, or executive abilities.
Contradictory findings have also been found with
regard to the correlates of concrete thinking. Silver-
stein et al. (1993) found that indices of left and right
cerebral lateralization from the Luria Nebraska Neu-
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ropsychological Battery explained only 11% and 14%
of the variance in concrete thinking, respectively, and
they failed to identify any independent neurocognitive
predictors. In contrast, Sponheim et al. (2003)
reported that 59% of the variance in concreteness
could be explained by estimated intellectual ability
and impairment in complex attention, visual memory,
and planning. Other investigators also have found
moderate to strong inverse relationships between
verbal intellectual ability and concreteness, but these
studies did not assess more specific neurocognitive
deficits (Hertler et al., 1978; Shimkunas et al., 1966).
In contrast to the varying results for idiosyncratic and
concrete thinking, a moderate to strong positive
relationship has consistently been found between
correct abstraction on proverbs and intellectual ability
(Carpenter and Chapman, 1982; Harrow et al., 1974;
Shimkunas et al., 1966). These studies were limited to
the assessment of intellectual ability, and to our
knowledge, associations with more specific neuro-
cognitive abilities have not been examined.
The goals of this study are: 1) to identify the
neurocognitive and social cognitive correlates of these
measures of formal thought disorder; 2) to identify
which cognitive correlates account for unique vari-
ance in formal thought disorder; and 3) to examine the
extent to which these neurocognitive and social
cognitive correlates account for variance in formal
thought disorder after accounting for general verbal
ability. We focused on bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking
rated from proverbs as a measure of formal thought
disorder. Although the Bizarre-Idiosyncratic Thinking
Rating System is less comprehensive than the
Thought, Language, and Communication scale
(TLC) (Andreasen, 1986), we used the Bizarre-
Idiosyncratic Thinking Rating System because we
have previously demonstrated that it is more sensitive
to subtle thought disorder than typical clinical ratings
based on conversational speech in the context of a
psychiatric interview, such as the conceptual disorga-
nization item from the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
(Subotnik et al., 2003). The neurocognitive measures
were selected from a battery that assessed simple and
complex attention, working memory, and verbal
learning. In addition, a measure of social schema
knowledge was included because Harrow et al. (1989)
hypothesized that impaired access to socially relevant
information might contribute to bizarre-idiosyncratic
thinking. The Social Feature Recognition Test (SFRT)
(Corrigan and Green, 1993) is an instrument that
quantifies the extent to which an individual has
knowledge of the features (actions, goals, etc.) of
social situations. Performance on the SFRT was
expected to contribute independently to bizarre-
idiosyncratic thinking. We examined two aspects of
formal thought disorder–bizarre-idiosyncratic and
concrete responses to proverbs–and a related con-
struct, correct abstraction of proverbs, in order to
examine their differing patterns of relationships to the
neurocognitive and social neurocognitive measures.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were receiving outpatient psychiatric
treatment at the UCLA Aftercare Research Program
and were either current or past participants in one of
three longitudinal studies of the early phase of
schizophrenia (Developmental Processes in Schizo-
phrenic Disorders Project; P.I., Keith H. Nuechterlein,
PhD). Full details of entry criteria for the Develop-
mental Processes project are available in Nuechterlein
et al. (1992). All participants met Research Diagnostic
Criteria (Spitzer et al., 1978) for either schizophrenic
disorder or schizoaffective disorder, mainly schizo-
phrenic. Classification by the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) was as follows:
Schizophrenia (n =31), schizophreniform (n =9),
schizoaffective disorder (n =6), or psychotic disorder
not otherwise specified (n =1). The participants
included 35 males and 12 females, and had a mean
age of 28.6 years (S.D.=6.4). The mean age of illness
onset was 23.6 years (S.D.=5.6), with a mean
duration of total illness, including prodromal symp-
toms, of 5.5 years (S.D.=4.4). All were fluent in
English. The participants’ parents had a mean educa-
tion level of 13.0 years (S.D.=2.7). The total score on
the 24-item Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
(BPRS)(Ventura et al., 1993) at the time of the
proverb task assessment was 39.7 (S.D.=12.6). All
participants were presented with oral and written
information about the research procedures involved
in the study, and they gave written informed consent.
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2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Formal thought disorder
2.2.1.1. Bizarre-Idiosyncratic Thinking Rating System
(BIZ) (Marengo et al., 1986). Responses to all three
sets (of 12 proverbs each) of the Gorham Proverbs
Test (Gorham, 1956) were used as speech samples
from which to rate bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking. The
proverbs were standard, common proverbs (e.g.,
bStrike while the iron is hotQ, bWhen the cat’s away
the mice will playQ), albeit some are outdated and
infrequently used (e.g., bThere’s many a slip twixt cup
and the lipQ). Proverbs were read to participants and
they were asked to explain the meaning of the saying.
The responses were not scored according to the
Gorham (1956) criteria, but were used as speech
samples for rating bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking
following the procedures of Marengo et al. (1986).
The overall rating of bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking
was used as the primary measure of bizarre respond-
ing. Each proverb response is rated on the following
scale: 0=absent; 0.5=mild or minimal bizarre qual-
ities; 1.0=moderate or clear evidence of bizarre
thinking, 3.0=very severe bizarre responding. Inter-
rater reliability was established based on 10 proverb
protocols between our staff raters and criterion ratings
provided by the scale authors (average intraclass
r =.83, range .73 to .93.).
On average, participants did not provide responses
(e.g., bI don’t knowQ) to 21.4% of the proverbs
administered. Participants might not provide a re-
sponse to a proverb for varied reasons, such as
unfamiliarity with the proverb (perhaps because it is
outdated and infrequently used), low intelligence, low
motivation, low self-esteem, as well as formal thought
disorder. Because we could not assume that not
responding was attributable to formal thought disor-
der, we excluded instances of no response to a
proverb. The sum of the thought disorder ratings for
each participant was divided by the total number of
responses given. The mean BIZ score on items for
which a ratable response was given was 0.2
(S.D.=0.3).
2.2.1.2. Abstract/Concrete Rating System (Marengo et
al., 1986). The responses to the Gorham Proverbs
Test were also used to rate concrete thinking and
correct abstraction. Concreteness and abstraction were
coded according to the definitions and procedures
provided by Marengo et al. (1986). An answer is
scored as concrete when a respondent fails to translate
the symbols or ideas presented in the proverb into a
more generalizable interpretation and instead either
explains, reacts to, or expands upon the original words
of the proverb. Responses are scored as abstract when
the proverb’s key symbols have been decoded into
more global concepts or generalizations regardless of
the correctness of the translation. Abstract responses
are then evaluated for correctness. If the respondent’s
answer captures the essential, consensually derived
meaning of the proverb, it is scored as abstract-
correct. Because we could not assume that non-
response to proverb was attributable to concrete
thinking, we computed mean summary scores by
dividing by the number of ratable responses. Note that
the categories of concrete and abstract are mutually
exclusive. To eliminate redundancy with the concrete
ratings, the correlates of abstract responses will not be
reported. Ratings on this scale were made by two staff
raters whose ratings yielded an intraclass correlation
was .86 for Concrete responses and .82 for Abstract-
Correct responses. For ratable responses to the
proverbs, the mean concrete responding score (0=ab-
stract, 1=concrete) was 0.35 (S.D.= .23), and the
mean correct abstraction score was 0.33 (S.D.= .20).
2.2.2. Neurocognition and social cognition
2.2.2.1. Digit Span Distractibility Test (DSDT) (Olt-
manns and Neale, 1975). In this test of immediate
or working auditory memory and distractibility,
participants listen to and repeat strings of digits
presented via audiotape by a female voice under
nondistraction and distraction conditions. In the
distraction condition, irrelevant digits were presented
by a male voice between the relevant digits. Imme-
diate auditory memory was measured as recall for the
long (6 to 8) digit series during the nondistraction and
the distraction conditions, each of which involves
seven items (Oltmanns, 1978). Distractibility was
computed as the difference between recall under
nondistraction and distraction conditions.
2.2.2.2. California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT)
(Delis et al., 1983). The CVLT is a test of verbal
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learning and episodic memory. Participants were read
lists of 16 semantically related words and asked to
recall as many of the words as possible under various
conditions of delay (0 vs. 20 min), type of recall (free
vs. cued/recognition), and retroactive inhibition (the
interpolation of another list). Indices of verbal
learning and attentional disturbance derived from the
CVLT examined here were: total recall on trials 1–5,
learning slope, and intrusions.
2.2.2.3. Degraded Stimulus Continuous Performance
Test (DS-CPT) (Nuechterlein, 1983). Sustained,
focused attention involving perceptual analysis and
discrimination processes was measured with a com-
puterized version of the DS-CPT (Nuechterlein and
Asarnow, 1999a). This task required the participant to
detect occurrences of b0Q during an 8-min period of
presentation of highly blurred single digits, 33 ms
each and 1/s. A black/white reversal of a random 40%
of pixels was used to produce degradation of the
stimulus as well as the background to create visual
noise. The proportion of targets was 0.25. A measure
of signal/noise discrimination, dV, was the primary
performance variable.
2.2.2.4. Memory Load Continuous Performance Test
(3–7 CPT) (Nuechterlein et al., 1986). This refine-
ment of the original A-X CPT (Rosvold et al., 1956)
measures focused, sustained attention under imme-
diate memory load conditions. Specifically, the
participant was asked to press a button each time
that a b3Q was followed by a b7Q within a quasi-
random series of single, clearly focused numeral
stimuli presented for 33 ms each at a rate of 1/s. In
this computerized version, (Nuechterlein and Asar-
now, 1999b) 640 stimuli were presented, 25% of
which were 3–7 sequences (12.5% were 7’s that
required a response). The primary performance
measure was again dV.
2.2.2.5. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
Vocabulary Subtest. The WAIS-R Vocabulary subtest
was administered using standard procedures (Wechsler,
1981). The scaled score was used as an index of
general verbal ability (Lezak, 1995).
2.2.2.6. The Situational Feature Recognition Test
(SFRT) (Corrigan and Green, 1993). The SFRT
assesses participants’ sensitivity to abstract and
concrete features of social situations. The primary
use of the test is to assess social representation
deficits in schizophrenic patients (Corrigan et al.,
1992). The test assesses participants’ knowledge
about four different social situations: eating at a
restaurant, attending an appointment with a doctor,
being a patient at a psychiatric hospital, and
attending an opera. For each social situation,
participants were presented with a printed list of 14
actions, 14 roles, 14 rules, and 14 goals (each
containing 6 targets and 8 distracters). Participants
were instructed to circle the actions, roles, rules, and
goals that would be appropriate for each type of
social situation. Following the procedures described
by Corrigan and Green (1993) a discrimination
index, AV, was computed for all ratings of actions,
roles, rules, and goals. Mean AV scores were
computed for each of the qualities across the four
types of social situations. The scores tended to be
negatively skewed, so an arcsine of the square root
transformation was applied.
2.2.3. Psychiatric symptom assessment
2.2.3.1. Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) (Ven-
tura et al., 1993). Severity of psychiatric symptoms
during the 2-week period prior to study participation
was assessed using the expanded version of the Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale. Severity was rated on a 7-
point scale (1=not present, 7=severe). On average,
participants did not have significant formal thought
disorder as measured by the BPRS Conceptual
Disorganization item (mean rating=1.4. S.D.=1.0)
or the Thinking Disturbance factor (M = 1.8,
S.D.=1.1). Only 16 participants were rated a b4Q
or above on any of the three positive symptom items
comprising the Thinking Disturbance factor (BPRS
items Unusual Thought Content, Hallucinatory Be-
havior, and Conceptual Disorganization).
3. Results
An initial set of bivariate correlational analyses
examined whether the key neurocognitive and social
cognitive variables predicted the three indices of proverb
interpretation—bizarre-idiosyncratic responses, con-
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crete responses, and abstract correct responses. The
descriptive statistics for these variables and the correla-
tional results are described below and summarized in
Table 1.
3.1. Bizarre-idiosyncratic, concrete, and correct
abstraction responses to proverbs
More frequent bizarre responses to the proverbs
were associated with more frequent concrete (r =.63,
p =.01) and with fewer correct abstraction responses
(r = .36, p = .02). As would be expected, the
categories of concrete and correct abstraction were
inversely correlated (r= .75, p =.01).
None of the three proverb ratings were significant-
ly associated with the degree of positive psychotic
symptoms as measured by the BPRS Thinking
Disturbance factor score. In addition, response bi-
zarreness showed a weak correlation with the BPRS
conceptual disorganization item that was not statisti-
cally significant (r=.28, p =.08).
3.2. Verbal learning, working memory
As shown in Table 1, frequency of bizarre proverb
responses was significantly associated with several
indices of verbal learning and immediate auditory
memory. Most notably, significant relationships were
found with rate of verbal learning, word intrusion
errors during recall, DSDT immediate auditory
memory, and DSDT distractibility. The verbal learn-
ing and memory correlates of concrete responding
were quite similar. Significant relationships were
found with verbal learning rate, intrusion errors, and
Table 1
Neurocognitive and social cognitive correlates of formal thought disorder
Measure Mean (S.D.) Bizarre Concrete Correct abstraction
Verbal learning, immediate memory
CVLT recall, trials 1–5 44.96 (11.26) Pearson correlation  .39  .51 .24
Sig. (2-tailed) .01 .00 .11
CVLT learning slope: raw score 1.02 (.72) Pearson correlation  .45  .21  .05
Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .16 .73
CVLT total intrusions (free and cued): raw 4.04 (5.86) Pearson correlation .43 .61  .39
Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .01
DSDT: nondistraction condition .72 (.19) Pearson correlation  .31  .45 .49
Sig. (2-tailed) .05 .00 .00
DSDT: difference between nondistraction  .02 (.12) Pearson Correlation .33 .06  .08
and distraction conditions Sig. (2-tailed) .04 .67 .59
Sustained focused attention and early perceptual processing
DS-CPT: dV 2.24 (1.11) Pearson correlation  .38  .51 .159
Sig. (2-tailed) .06 .01 .44
3–7 CPT: dV 3.65 (1.04) Pearson correlation  .40  .25 .33
Sig. (2-tailed) .04 .20 .08
Social Features Recognition Test (SFRT)
SFRT rules .91 (.06) Pearson correlation  .35  .24 .19
Sig. (2-tailed) .02 .11 .21
SFRT rules .93 (.03) Pearson correlation  .02  .06 .20
Sig. (2-tailed) .88 .68 .19
SFRT acts .93 (.03) Pearson correlation  .21  .04 .12
Sig. (2-tailed) .18 .80 .42
SFRT goals .92 (.04) Pearson correlation  .26  .31 .23
Sig. (2-tailed) .09 .04 .12
General verbal ability
WAIS-R Vocabulary scaled score 8.7 (3.1) Pearson correlation  .54  .66 .71
Sig. (2-tailed) .01 .01 .01
K.L. Subotnik et al. / Schizophrenia Research 85 (2006) 84–95 89
immediate auditory memory. In contrast, correct
abstraction was associated with fewer intrusion errors
and better immediate auditory memory.
3.3. Sustained focused attention and early perceptual
processing
Data for the computerized DS-CPT and 3–7 CPT
were available for only 30 participants, 26 of whom
also had available ratings on bizarreness of proverb
responses. The other study participants had taken a
noncomputerized form of these tests that was not
comparable, and therefore, not included in this
analysis. Bizarre responding was significantly corre-
lated with 3–7 CPT dV and showed a tendency in the
same direction for DS-CPT dV. Twenty-nine of the
participants with computerized DS-CPT and 3–7 CPT
data also had ratings of concreteness and correct
abstraction of proverb responses. The proportion of
proverbs rated as concrete was significantly associated
with DS-CPT dV, but not with 3–7 CPT dV.
3.4. Social schema
Bizarreness of proverb responses was significantly
associated with poorer ability to correctly identify the
brulesQ of social situations on the SFRT test, and
concrete responses were associated with poorer ability
to correctly identify the correct bgoals.Q Correct
abstraction on proverbs was not significantly associ-
ated with SFRT performance. Of note, none of the
SFRT categories were significantly associated with the
WAIS-R Vocabulary scaled score (r’s ranged from
 .04 to .28).
3.5. WAIS-R Vocabulary subtest
Higher WAIS-R Vocabulary scores were signifi-
cantly associated with less bizarre-idiosyncratic prov-
erb responses, fewer concrete responses, and more
frequent correctly abstracted proverb responses.
3.6. Multivariate prediction of responses to proverbs
To determine which of the different neurocognitive
and social cognitive variables made independent
contributions to the prediction of anomalous proverb
responses, we entered these variables into multiple
regression models. Selection of predictors within tests
emphasized the strongest bivariate relationship with
the proverb score. The measures from the DS-CPT
and the 3–7 CPT were not included in any of the
multiple regression analyses because comparable data
were unavailable for a substantial subset of partic-
ipants due to the initial use of noncomputerized CPTs.
3.6.1. Bizarre responses to proverbs
For bizarre proverb responses, the predictor vari-
ables were CVLT learning slope for trials 1 through 5,
CVLT total intrusions, DSDT distractibility index, and
SFRT rules subscale score. This model accounted for
40% of the variance in bizarre responding (see Table
2). The CVLT learning slope and intrusion error total
made significant independent contributions to the
prediction of bizarre responses, while the DSDT
distractibility index and SFRT rules subscale score
did not.
To examine whether the neurocognitive measures
contribute to the prediction of bizarre responding after
Table 2
Multiple regression models for bizarre, concrete, and correct abstraction proverb responses
Bizarre Concrete Correct abstraction
R2 df B p R2 df B p R2 df B p
Overall model .40 4, 37 NA .001 .54 4, 41 NA .001 .31 2, 43 NA .001
CVLT learning trials 1–5 – –  .18 .16 – –
CVLT learning slope 1–5  .31 .04 – – – –
CVLT intrusions (free and cued) .33 .02 .44 .01  .29 .03
DSDT nondistraction – –  .28 .02 .42 .003
DSDT distractability index .22 .10 – – – –
SFRT rules  .11 .46 – – – –
SFRT goals – –  .16 .16 – –
–=variable not entered into regression model.
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accounting for prediction by general verbal ability,
this analysis was repeated, controlling for WAIS-R
Vocabulary level. WAIS-R Vocabulary scaled score
was entered in step 1 and explained 29% of the
variance (see Table 3). The remaining predictor
variables were entered in step 2, and the total model
accounted for 52% of the variance in bizarre-
idiosyncratic thinking (for R2 change, F(4,34)=4.1,
p = .008). It is also noteworthy that the BPRS
conceptual disorganization item, which we previously
found not to have the same sensitivity to subtle formal
thought disorder, was not as well predicted by this
model. The model accounted for only 19% of the
variance in the BPRS conceptual disorganization item
(27% with WAIS-R Vocabulary).
3.6.2. Concrete responses to proverbs
A separate multiple regression model examined the
significant correlates of concrete thinking. The pre-
dictor variables for concrete thinking were: CVLT
learning trials 1–5, CVLT total intrusions, DSDT
nondistraction condition performance, and SFRT
goals subscale. A regression model with these
predictors accounted for 54% of the variance in
concrete responding. CVLT intrusions and DSDT
immediate recall for nondistraction items indepen-
dently contributed to the prediction of concrete
thinking.
Again, a second regression model was computed
with the WAIS-R Vocabulary scaled score entered in
step 1 to examine the extent to which the more
specific neurocognitive variables predicted thought
disorder beyond their relationship with general verbal
ability. The WAIS-R Vocabulary scale accounted for
45% of the variance in concrete thinking (see Table
3). With the remaining predictor variables entered in
step 2, the total model accounted for 67% of the
variance (for R2 change, F(4,36)=5.8, p =.001).
3.6.3. Correctly abstracted responses to proverbs
A multiple regression model to explain the
variance in correct abstraction was computed with
CVLT total intrusions (free and cued) and DSDT
nondistraction condition performance as predictor
variables. This regression model accounted for 31%
of the variance in correctly abstracted responding,
with both neurocognitive measures independently
contributing to the prediction of correct abstraction.
Again, a second multiple regression analysis
entered the WAIS-R Vocabulary score in step 1, with
the other predictor variables entered in step 2. The
WAIS-R Vocabulary score accounted for 53% of the
variance in correct abstraction, and the full model
accounted for a total of 57% of the variance. The
neurocognitive variables in step 2 did not add
significantly to the overall prediction of correct
abstraction (for R2 change, F(2,38)=1.8, p =.18, for
step 2)(see Table 3).
4. Discussion
Two aspects of formal thought disorder, bizarre-
idiosyncratic and concrete thinking, were rated from
responses to proverbs in outpatients with schizophre-
nia. Whereas previous studies have found these
Table 3
Multiple regression models for bizarre, concrete, and correct abstraction proverb responses (including WAIS-R Vocabulary as a predictor)
Bizarre Concrete Correct abstraction
R2 df B p R2 df B p R2 df B p
Overall model .52 5, 34 NA .001 .67 5, 36 NA .001 .57 3, 38 NA .001
WAIS-R Vocabulary scaled score  .46 .002  .40 .002  .60 .001
CVLT learning trials 1–5 – –  .26 .03 – –
CVLT learning slope 1–5  .39 .007 – – – –
CVLT intrusions (free and cued) .13 .35 .22 .07  .04 .74
DSDT nondistraction – –  .17 .14 .22 .07
DSDT distractability index .20 .10 – – – –
SFRT rules .05 .72 – – – –
SFRT goals – –  .12 .25 – –
–=variable not entered into regression model.
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indexes of thought disorder to be relatively distinct
constructs (Craig, 1973; Harrow et al., 1997; Silver-
stein et al., 1993; Sponheim et al., 2003) in the current
study they were strongly associated with each other
and had generally similar neurocognitive correlates.
We identified a subset of neurocognitive and social
cognitive variables that together accounted for a
substantial amount of variance in these aspects of
formal thought disorder. The total amount of variance
accounted for could be increased by adding general
verbal ability to prediction equations, but even then
the neurocognitive variables contributed significant
additional variance.
The relationships between our measures of thought
disorder and sustained, focused attention, verbal
learning, immediate auditory memory, distractibility,
and intrusions are consistent with the idea that basic
cognitive deficits in initial discrimination of relevant
stimuli and encoding of relevant information into
memory are part of the causal pathways leading to
formal thought disorder (Maher, 1972). The strength
of the relationships between cognitive impairment and
concrete thinking found in this study parallels the
results reported by Sponheim et al. (2003). Intellectual
ability and measures of attentional control and
memory explained 67% of the variance in concrete-
ness in the current study and 59% in the Sponheim et
al. study. Our finding that impairment in immediate
memory and attentional control were related to
concreteness is consistent with Spitzer’s et al. (1993)
theory that the ability to abstract is dependent upon
working memory capacity to hold and manipulate
information. Our findings regarding list learning
intrusions are also consistent with the hypothesis of
Harrow et al. (1989) that bizarre-idiosyncratic think-
ing results, in part, from an inability to adequately
monitor verbal output for errors. Our current results
from the attentional tasks replicate Silverstein et al.’s
(1993) finding that intellectual ability and complex
attention were predictive of bizarre-idiosyncratic
thinking and extend earlier work relating sustained
and complex attention and working memory capacity
to positive formal thought disorder assessed with the
Thought Disorder Index (Holzman et al., 1986;
Nuechterlein et al., 1986) and the TLC (Andreasen,
1986; Harvey et al., 1988; Serper et al., 1990).
Further, our findings that social feature recognition
was associated with bizarre proverb responding is
consistent with Harrow’s hypothesis (Harrow et al.,
1989) that difficulty accessing information about what
is socially appropriate in a given situation contributes
to bizarre speech. In the current results, knowledge of
social features was also related to concreteness,
suggesting that concrete responses also reflect an
unawareness of what is expected by the format of the
testing situation. Multiple regression analyses did not
isolate a significant predictive contribution from
social feature recognition that was independent of
the neurocognitive predictors, at least using the SFRT
as the social cognitive measure.
To shed light on previous, disparate results
regarding the relationship of general cognitive ability
versus more circumscribed cognitive deficits to
formal thought disorder, we examined the predictive
contribution of discrete neurocognitive impairments
after controlling for global verbal ability with the
WAIS-R Vocabulary subtest. However, this is a very
conservative approach, as the specific neurocognitive
deficits that contributed to thought disorder on the
proverb test could also impair performance on the
vocabulary test. For example, basic cognitive deficits
that result in concrete thinking will, in turn, lead to
incorrect descriptions of word definitions. Thus,
vocabulary knowledge is likely to be an indicator
of both premorbid verbal ability in these patients as
well as neurocognitive deficits associated with
psychosis, which would inflate the relationship
between verbal ability and thought disorder. Even
with this conservative method, a group of neuro-
cognitive variables examined in this study were
found to significantly contribute to the overall
prediction of both bizarre and concrete thinking. It
may be noteworthy that, after accounting for general
cognitive ability, only verbal learning independently
contributed to the prediction of bizarre and concrete
responses.
The use of the Bizarre-Idiosyncratic Thinking
Rating System and the Abstract/Concrete Rating
System limits this study to only two dimensions of
formal thought disorder. In contract, use of the TLC,
which is rated based on responses during a clinical
interview, would have allowed a more comprehensive
assessment of thought disorder. However, the current
participants had low BPRS conceptual disorganization
item ratings, and would likely also have had low TLC
ratings. Our set of cognitive predictors accounted for
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far less variance in thought disorder rated based on
responses during a clinical interview (i.e., the BPRS
conceptual disorganization item), than in bizarre
proverb responses. Because the BPRS conceptual
disorganization rating is less sensitive to subtle
thought disorder than the proverbs measure, it was
harder to predict that BPRS rating as it contains less
true score variance. This finding is consistent with our
previous work, wherein a brain region known to be
associated with formal thought disorder was more
strongly associated with bizarre proverb responses
than with the BPRS conceptual disorganization item
(Subotnik et al., 2003). Thus, these results are
consistent with the view that speech elicited by the
proverbs test and rated using the Bizarre-Idiosyncratic
Rating System is a more sensitive indicator of formal
thought disorder than is this BPRS item.
Our results are also consistent with Harrow et al.’s
(2004) finding that the proverbs test, which involves a
working memory component, more frequently elicited
severe thought disorder than a task that did not involve
working memory. It is possible that the neurocognitive
measures in the current study share more overlapping
variance with the proverbs responses than the BPRS
conceptual disorganization item because the proverbs
test is in itself a cognitive task.
Our regression analyses were completed to identify
which discrete cognitive variables made independent
contributions to the prediction of anomalous proverbs
responding. These models took advantage of pre-
selection of predictor variables already shown to be
associated with the outcome measure in this sample.
Thus, the resulting impressive amount of variance
accounted for in the multiple regression models
requires replication in a separate sample. Our use of
the SFRT allowed us to include a brief measure of
social cognition in this battery. However, the SFRT
had a substantial ceiling effect, which required data
transformation prior to analysis. Future studies should
examine whether a wider range of social cognition
measures, with better psychometric properties, are
associated with formal thought disorder in a way that
is independent of the role of basic neurocognitive
measures. Another limitation of this study was that the
sustained, focused attention measures were not
available on all participants, thus precluding their
use in the multiple regression analyses. Thus, the
independent predictive contributions of these meas-
ures could not be determined. Nevertheless, this study
shows the promise of neurocognitive and social
cognitive deficits as correlates and possible determi-
nants of formal thought disorder in schizophrenia.
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